New vs. Reelected Mayor: Who Is More Responsive to Disasters?

Mel Lorenzo Accad
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Mel Lorenzo Accad: University of Hawaii at Manoa

No 202003, UP School of Economics Discussion Papers from University of the Philippines School of Economics

Abstract: Are new mayors more responsive to disasters than their reelected counterparts? The identification strategy is based on slim vote margin in which new and reelected mayors are found to be as if randomly assigned. We find that with greater storm exposure: new mayors spend more on health sector than reelected mayors. We don’t find stable and statistically significant result in other sectors and in total municipal income or expenditure.

Keywords: election; accountability; disaster response (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H84 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
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Published as UPSE Discussion Paper No. 2020-03, March 2020

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:phs:dpaper:202003

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