Delaying and Motivating Decisions in the (Bully) Dictator Game

Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli, Pietro Guarnieri and Lorenzo Spadoni

Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Abstract: We investigate experimentally how decisions in the Dictator Game are affected by cognitive manipulations aimed at promoting greater reliance on deliberation. Specifically, we run an online experiment where we have 6 distinct experimental conditions resulting from the combination of 2 conditions for the Dictator Game (non-bully: the dictator is initially endowed with all the money; bully: the initial endowment is equally split), and 3 conditions for the cognitive manipulations (time delay: decisions are delayed; motivated delay: decisions are delayed and a written motivation is required; control: no manipulation). We find that the equal initial endowment leads the dictator to keep less for himself, confirming in the online setting previous evidence from the lab. Further, our findings suggest that the request to write a motivation makes subjects take less for themselves with respect to the mere request to wait some time before choosing.

Keywords: dual process; motivation; deliberation; intuition; Dictator Game; bully; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Related works:
Journal Article: Delaying and motivating decisions in the (Bully) dictator game (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2021/277

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