Norms and anti-coordination: elicitation and priming in an El Farol Bar Game experiment

Pietro Guarnieri and Lorenzo Spadoni

Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Abstract: In this experimental study, we delve into the role of personal and social norms in an anti-coordination decision, such as the choice between staying home or going out in the El Farol Bar Game. Our design consists of two interconnected studies: in Study 1, we elicit either empirical or normative expectations before subjects make their decision in a one-shot El Farol Bar Game; in Study 2, subjects play two El Farol Bar games with different social-expectation primes. Our results reveal that the majority of subjects believe that staying home is the right thing to do and tend to act in accordance with their normative belief. Nevertheless, there is no prevailing consensus on what others believe is normatively right (normative expectations), and subjects do not base their decisions on these expectations. Conversely, a substantial majority of subjects expects that the predominant behavior is staying home (empirical expectations), and subjects tend to adhere to their empirical expectations. As far as social-expectation primes are concerned, they only lower subjects’ propensity to go out. This happens only when the prime conveys an empirical expectation to go out or a normative expectation to stay home. Furthermore, we observe a relatively low rate of change in the second El Farol Bar decision, and this does not hinge on the prime content.

Keywords: wealth; anti-coordination games; social expectations; normative beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D83 D84 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2024/303

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