Bidder Collusion: Accounting for All Feasible Bidders

Jean-François Richard

No 6759, Working Paper from Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

Abstract: The Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) sells timber from state lands bymeans of ascending bid auction. In our empirical analysis of all IDL scaleauctions from 2004 through 2015, accounting for all auction-specific feasiblebidders, we find significant evidence of bidder collusion. Given the complexityof the empirical model and the absence of analytic results, we apply the methodof simulated moments to estimate the parameters and Monte Carlo simulationsto produce standard deviations of the estimates. The loss to Idaho from thebidder collusion is estimated to be approximately $43 million over this timeperiod.

Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/working_papers/WP.19.06.upload.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pit:wpaper:6759

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).