Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game
Xiaojie Chen and
Attila Szolnoki
PLOS Computational Biology, 2018, vol. 14, issue 7, 1-15
Abstract:
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolving game reveals that beside a delicately adjusted punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should pay special attention to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even the usage of tough punishment cannot save the community from an undesired end.Author summary: Our proposed model considers not only the fundamental dilemma of individual and collective benefits but also focuses on their impacts on the environmental state. In general, there is a strong interdependence between individual actions and the actual shape of environment that can be described by means of a co-evolutionary model. Such approach recognizes the fact that even if our common-pool resources are partly renewable, they have limited growth capacities hence a depleted environment is unable to recover and reach a sustainable level again. This scenario would have a dramatic consequence on our whole society, therefore we should avoid it by punishing those who are not exercising restrain. We provide analytical and numerical evidences which highlight that punishment alone may not necessarily be a powerful tool to maintain a healthy shape of environment for the benefit of future generations. Cooperator actors, who are believed to take care of present state of our environment, should also consider carefully the growth capacity of renewable resources.
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1006347
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006347
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