Carbon emission reduction and profit distribution mechanism of construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade

Wen Jiang, Li Yuan, Lanjun Wu and Shiyue Guo

PLOS ONE, 2019, vol. 14, issue 10, 1-23

Abstract: Fairness concern behavior is extremely common in social life, and many scholars are beginning to pay attention to this behavior. In this study, we investigate a two-echelon construction supply chain that consists of a general contractor and a subcontractor under cap-and-trade policy. We study the carbon emission reduction decisions and profit distribution mechanism in the construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade. We use the Nash bargaining model to describe the fairness concerns of the construction supply chain members and use the co-opetition model to portray the profit distribution. We show that the fairness concern can impose an adverse influence on firms’ profits and decrease the magnitude of their carbon emission reductions. The subcontractor’s fairness concern causes greater losses to the construction supply chain’s profit. We further demonstrate the impact of fairness concern on the optimal decisions of the general contractor and the subcontractor through numerical analysis.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0224153

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0224153

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