The Relationship between Trigger Price and Punishment Period in Green and Porter (1984) Game made Endogenous

Antonio Brandao, Luís Guimarães () and Carlos Seixas
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Luís Guimarães: Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto

FEP Working Papers from Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto

Abstract: Green and Porter (1984) made a huge contribution to Industrial Organization Theory where a trigger price is defined by firms and whenever the price falls below this trigger price, the firms cease to produce at the monopoly level and enter into a punishment period. Our goal with this paper is to define, endogenously in the model, relationships between the trigger price and the punishment period, which were set exogenously in the original paper.

Keywords: Green and Porter (1984); trigger price; punishment period (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-com and nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:por:fepwps:432

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