How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: a machine learning approach

Maximilian Andres (), Lisa Bruttel and Jana Friedrichsen
Additional contact information
Maximilian Andres: University of Potsdam

No 53, CEPA Discussion Papers from Center for Economic Policy Analysis

Abstract: This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.

Keywords: cartel; collusion; communication; machine learning; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D43 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-cmp, nep-com, nep-exp and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-56223 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach (2023)
Journal Article: How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach (2023)
Working Paper: How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach (2022)
Working Paper: How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pot:cepadp:53

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPA Discussion Papers from Center for Economic Policy Analysis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marco Winkler ().