Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition

Kai Andree ()

No 104, Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge from Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät

Abstract: This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.

Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets with Quantity Competition (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pot:vwldis:104

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