Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Punishment

Johannes Buckenmaier, Eugen Dimant, Ann-Christin Posten and Ulrich Schmidt

No 14, PPE Working Papers from Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: This paper presents the first controlled economic experiment to study celerity, i.e. the effectiveness of swiftness of punishment in reducing illicit behavior. We consider two dimensions: timing of punishment and timing of the resolution of uncertainty regarding the punishment. We find a surprising u-shaped relation between deterrence and the delays of punishment and uncertainty resolution. Institutions that either reveal detection and impose punishment immediately or maintain uncertainty about the state of detection and impose punishment sufficiently late are equally effective at deterring illicit behavior. Our results yield strong implications for the design of institutional policies to mitigate misconduct and reduce recidivism.

Keywords: Deterrence; Institutions; Punishment; Swiftness; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D81 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2018-08-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://www.sas.upenn.edu/ppe-repec/ppc/wpaper/0014.pdf Second version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Punishment (2017)
Working Paper: On punishment institutions and effective deterrence of illicit behavior (2017)
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