Executive compensation and risk-taking of Chinese banks

Qhuang Huang

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We document a significantly positive relationship between executive compensation and risk-taking of Chinese listed banks over the 2007–2018 period. The finding is robust to the risk measures (Z-score, systematic risk and stock return volatility) used, the way to calculate executive compensation, and model specifications as well as estimation techniques. Further analysis suggests that bank past performance (captured by return on equity) strongly moderates the relationship between executive compensation and risk-taking. We also find a modest U-shaped association of bank Z-score with executive compensation. Our study appears to support the regulation on executive compensation for the sake of bank stability.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Bank risk; Bank performance; Z-score; Chinese banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04-18, Revised 2020-04-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100377/1/MPRA_paper_100377.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:100377

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().