A Note on Antitrust, Labor, and “No Cold Call” Agreements in Silicon Valley

Russell Pittman

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Firms that provide training to their labor force may risk ex post opportunistic behavior on the part of their workers or of competing firms. Some arguably restrictive firm practices that have been justified by this concern include employment contracts restricting the freedom of workers to seek employment from the firm’s competitors and agreements among competing firms not to solicit or hire certain of each other’s workers – sometimes termed “non-compete” and “no poach” agreements, respectively. This Note considers these two categories of practices in the context of recent public discussions and enforcement actions by the US competition law enforcement agencies.

Keywords: antitrust; competition; labor markets; non-compete agreements; no-poach agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J2 J24 L4 L41 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104338/1/MPRA_paper_104338.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:104338

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().