Honesty in the City

Martin Dufwenberg, Maroš Servátka, Jorge Tarrasó and Radovan Vadovič

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than conventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern extends to a field setting where (much like in a lab) we are able to control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: cab drivers in Mexico City. We find a remarkably high degree of trustworthiness, also with price-haggling, which is predicted to reduce trustworthiness.

Keywords: trust; honesty; reciprocity; field experiment; haggling; taxis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/106256/1/MPRA_paper_106256.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Honesty in the city (2023)
Working Paper: Honesty in the City (2022)
Working Paper: Honesty in the city (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:106256

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