Collusion in Supply Functions under Technology Licensing

Ihsan Celen and Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider an infinitely-lived duopoly with asymmetric costs and study the incentives of the firms to collude or compete in supply functions under the possibility of technology licensing. Simulating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of alternative industry organizations, we show that licensing makes collusion harder; but it always has a positive effect on the welfares of consumers and the less efficient firm in the duopoly.

Keywords: Duopoly; collusion; supply function equilibrium; licensing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Collusion in supply functions under technology licensing (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:107261

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