Licensing Cost-Reducing Innovations Under Supply Function Competition

Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we study the problem of licensing cost-reducing innovations in a duopoly under supply function competition. We show that the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing to no licensing if its cost advantage is not extremely large. Moreover, if its cost advantage is not extremely small, the innovator prefers fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing, as well.

Keywords: Duopoly; licensing; supply function competition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/107293/1/MPRA_paper_107293.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Licensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competition (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:107293

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