A check for rational inattention

Greg Howard

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Models of rational inattention allow agents to make mistakes in their actions while assuming they do not make mistakes in attention allocation. I test this assumption by comparing attention’s marginal benefit (better actions) and marginal cost (less time for future decisions) using millions of online chess moves. I cannot reject that skilled players equalize marginal benefit and marginal cost across different time controls. Bad players, when they have little time, under-adjust their attention allocation, leading them to have higher marginal cost. A simple intervention improves players' attention allocation.

Keywords: rational inattention; deterministic games; cognitive costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Check for Rational Inattention (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:108243

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