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The Economics of Student Attendance

Pantelis Pipergias Analytis, Rajesh Ramachandran, Chris Rauh and Jack Willis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The most common method of education remains that of the student teacher relationship in the classroom. Within this framework, although the student has the final choice on attendance, the educational institution can affect his relevant incentives. At the two extremes, full attendance can be mandatory for completion of the course, or attendance can be entirely optional. This article begins with a theoretical model showing that under the assumptions of rational individuals, no externalities, and “perfect evaluation methods”, optional attendance is optimal. The three central assumptions of the model are then relaxed to show that under certain conditions, assuming a high social value of education, institutional intervention can be justified economically. The approach is enriched with many practical examples, and the efficiency of numerous attendance rules is discussed. The article concludes with the deduction of policy recommendations for educational institutions

Keywords: attendance laws; time allocation; educational production funtions; screening; mandatory attendance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A20 D82 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
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