Un Modelo Principal-Agente Dinámico de Reducción de Perdidas de Energía Electrica en Tiempo Continuo

A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model of Electric Power Loss Reduction in Continuous Time

Juan Zambrano, José Gabriel Astaíza-Gómez and Juan David García

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this article we analyze the remuneration mechanism for the reduction of energy losses, through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The agent represents the power distribution company, which makes investments, or in other words, makes an effort to reduce energy losses. The principal represents the regulator, who offers a contract (regulation) to the agent, designed with the purpose of inducing the agent to exert the optimal effort, in the sense that such effort maximizes the expectation of power distribution minus the cost of compensating the agent. In our model, the energy distribution follows a process of diffusion with drift (drift), determined by the effort of the agent, not observable or verifiable by the principal. The optimal contract, carried out on the basis of the continuation value of the agent as a state variable, is calculated from a differential equation.

Keywords: Natural Monopoly; Electric Power Losses; Remuneration; Asymmetric Information; Moral Hazard. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C62 D21 D42 D61 D81 D82 D86 G32 G35 G38 H25 H32 L51 Q41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-ore and nep-reg
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110423/7/MPRA_paper_110143.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110423/15/MPRA_paper_110423.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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