Corruption of the Politicized University: Lessons from the Orange Revolution in Ukraine

Ararat Osipian ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper argues that corruption is used on a systematic basis as a mechanism of direct and indirect administrative control from the state level down to local authorities and administrations of public and private institutions. Informal approval of corrupt activities in exchange for loyalty and compliance with the regime is commonplace in many countries. This paper explains how corrupt regimes maximize their position in terms of loyalty and compliance by using the example of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. It presents mechanisms by which political bureaucracies politicize universities in order to influence students and channel their electoral power during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

Keywords: corruption; elections; politicization; students; university; Ukraine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 I28 P36 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-edu and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11312

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