Los beneficios del liderazgo en el mercado de depósitos bancarios: Una comparación entre Cournot y Stackelberg
The benefits of leadership in the banking deposit market: A comparison between Cournot and Stackelberg
Antonio Ruiz-Porras
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
We analyze the effects of leadership in banking when oligopolistic competition exists in the market of deposits. We assess such effects by comparing the performance of banking systems that only differ on their strategic interactions. Specifically, we compare the outcomes associated to strategies of the Cournot and Stackelberg types (symmetric competition and leader-follower strategies). Our main findings suggest that there are private and social benefits associated to leadership. The results suggest that it induces high levels of deposits, of returns and of consumption for long-term depositors. Moreover, leadership enhances financial stability and efficiency in banking.
Keywords: banks; leadership; deposits; benefits; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D92 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-com
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Journal Article: Los beneficios del liderazgo en el mercado de depositos bancarios: Una comparacion entre Cournot y Stackelberg (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:11351
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