Women's Empowerment and Intra-Household Bargaining Power

Marina Nacka, Andreas Drichoutis and Rodolfo Nayga

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We assess the effectiveness of the Abbreviated Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (A-WEAI) in predicting intra-household bargaining power. We conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment with 464 agricultural households, where spouses made decisions about money allocations. The experiment tested whether they would choose efficient overall household gains or favor individual monetary benefits. Our findings demonstrate that women's empowerment levels, as measured by the A-WEAI, are predictive of decisions in the allocation task. This supports the A-WEAI's utility in representing and predicting intra-household dynamics.

Keywords: A-WEAI; allocation task; dictator game; agricultural households (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 D13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:120095

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