The Vote, The Politics and the interjurisdictional Transfers: The Romanian Case

Mihai Mutascu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper represents a continuation of a previous paper, Mutaşcu & Dima (2005), where we demonstrated the “abnormal” behavior that local authority from Romania is manifesting regarding the subventions received from the central budget. In accord with public choice theory, exist an “affinity” of a social group - local communities in this case - for a certain political party or political coalition, in which case can expect that the distribution of public funds, having the nature of transfers given by the central budget to local budgets, to be impregnated with a considerable “political color”. This paper is trying to establish, in Romania, quantitative and qualitative, the modality of distributing the central public funds to local authorities under the political impact.

Keywords: Politic; voter; local financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 E62 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-tra
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12048/1/MPRA_paper_12048.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12272/1/MPRA_paper_12272.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12048

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