中小投资者保护、股权结构与公司价值

Protection of Minority Shareholders, Ownership Structure and Corporate Valuation

Yan Chen

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investor protection and corporate valuation. “Tunneling effects” which means that the controlling shareholders enrich themselves by expropriating the rights and interests of minor shareholders are usually referred in recent literatures of corporate finance. In this paper, we build a simple model which combines the firm’s inside ownership structure with outside law and regulation surrounding in order to inhibit “Tunneling effects”, and then we analyze their effects on corporate valuation. Finally, we test the hypothesis obtained from the model using a sample of 110 firms listed in Chinese stock market. The empirical results show that better protection of minority shareholders and appropriate ownership structures can help to elevate the valuation of firms.

Keywords: Investor protection; Law and regulation; Ownership structure; Corporate valuation; Panel data estimate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11, Revised 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12427/1/MPRA_paper_12427.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12427

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().