Enjeux stratégiques du concours des Maîtres de Conférences
Guillaume Haeringer and
Vincent Iehlé
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Contrary to most countries, the recruitment of assistant professors in France is centralized: recruitment committees submit a ranking of candidates to the Ministry of Education, the candidates submit their own ranking over the faculties that rank them and the Ministry compute the final match accordingly to these lists. The strategic stakes of this procedure are not well known in France. We show that the procedure satisfies desirable properties of stability and optimality. In order to do so, we identify the matching rule used by the Ministry using the information available to the candidates. The structure of the algorithm that produce the final matching is also analyzed. Finally, we discuss the existence of quotas on Departments rankings, the new features of the next campaign of recruitment and their relationships with job mobility.
Keywords: French academic job market; matching model; stability; strategic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-sog
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:13002
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