A price mechanism in economies with asymmetric information

Marta Faias, Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Emma Moreno García
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Emma Moreno-García

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim is to describe the equilibrium price formation and how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. For it, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley-Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003).

Keywords: C72/; D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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