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Regulatory strategies

Marianne Ojo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Over the years, there has been a shift from a wide command-and-control style of supervision whereby the regulator imposes detailed rules with which regulators supervise to one which consists of risk based regulatory strategies. ‘Enforced Self Regulation’, a regulatory strategy whereby negotiation takes places between the State and the individual firms, lies between the command-and-control style of supervision and meta risk regulation in that firms are still required to regulate but according to their own models. It differs from the traditional command-and-control style of bank supervision in that firms and not the regulator, are required to regulate. It is similar to meta-risk regulation in that the individual firm’s model is taken into consideration in regulating such firms. Whilst the merits and disadvantages of the individual regulatory strategies are considered, this paper concludes that all regulatory strategies should take into consideration the importance of management responsibilities – both on individual and corporate levels.

Keywords: command; control; regulation; meta; risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09, Revised 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-law
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15542/1/MPRA_paper_15542.pdf original version (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Regulatory Strategies (2008) Downloads
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