Assimetria de Informações e Pagamento de Proventos na Bovespa

Asymmetric Information and Dividends Payment at Bovespa

Robert Iquiapaza, Wagner Lamounier and Hudson Amaral

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this research it is evaluated the effect of the asymmetric information, the agency costs and the property structure in the determination of the dividend payments. The Tobit regression model was used for censured data, giving consistence to the estimates with the payout index truncated at zero. They were considered the statements of 178 open companies quoted at Bovespa, in the period of 2000-2004. It was verified that the probability of dividend payments increases with the growth possibilities, the size, the cash flow, the decrease of the company’s debt and the adhesion of the company to the governance levels. Companies with ADRs at NYSE, or with smaller asymmetric information, pay smaller dividends, what is in line with the signaling hypothesis. It was verified a negative relationship of the dividend payments with the growth opportunities and positive with the cash flow, as foreseen by the pecking order hypothesis. Lastly, after controlling by asymmetric information, the property concentration for the controller (insider) presented a negative relationship with the dividends policy.

Keywords: Dividends; asymmetric information; agency costs; property structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9449/3/MPRA_paper_9449.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9450/1/MPRA_paper_9450.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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