Bureaucracy and Corruption Taxation Proof

Mohamed Jellal ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of bribery between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing tax rates when the supervisor is likely to engage in corrupt transaction with taxpayer. The combat against collusion may explain the greater reliance on indirect taxes than on direct taxes both in developed and developing countries

Keywords: Principal Agent Supervisor; Bureaucracy; Collusion; Tax evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cta and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17177/1/MPRA_paper_17177.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:17177

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().