Student Placement in Egyptian Colleges

Tarek Selim () and Sherif Salem

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study students placement in Egyptian colleges under the current demand/supply placement mechanism implemented in Egypt (e-mechanism). We show that the e-mechanism is not Pareto efficient nor strategy proof and, moreover, it can not be improved to accommodate Pareto efficiency nor strategy proofness. The final conclusion is that it is better, from an efficiency point of view, to adopt a matching algorithm, like the Gale-Shapley mechanism, in students placement.

Keywords: Student placement; Gale-Shapley mechanism; e-mechanism; Egypt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cwa, nep-edu and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:17596

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