Managerial Strategies of the Cotton South

Tetsuya Saito

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Relative efficiencies of antebellum slave farms are suggested by many empirical studies. This paper considers a theoretical aspect of those results using a repeated principal-agent problem. Within its theoretical analysis, with relevance to profitability of slave farms, it will be shown that when inter-temporal punishments are necessary and when they can perform efficiently in production. Applying those theoretical results, some empirical studies on relative profitability and relative efficiencies are discussed. In the empirical study, relative efficiencies of each farm scale—free farms, task farms, and gang farms—are estimated region by region by a stochastic profit frontier model.

Keywords: Relative efficiency of antebellum slave farms; repeated principal-agent problem; profit maximizing contracts; stick and carrot on plantations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 J41 N51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05, Revised 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-cse
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/181/1/MPRA_paper_181.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:181

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().