Trade reform in a corrupt economy: A note

Biswajit Mandal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We construct a general equilibrium model and analyze the effectiveness of trade reform in a distorted economy where distortion exists in form of bureaucratic corruption that arises because of trade protection at the border. In this kleptocratic set up, intermediaries are employed in order to run off from paying a part of import tariff. We use HOSV kind of framework to prove that whether trade liberalization necessarily helps reducing corruption activities and to check what happens to the production of commodities.

Keywords: Corruption; International Trade; Tariff Reform; General Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D5 D73 F1 F11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:18811

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