A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness

Emanuele Canegrati

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benevolents.

Keywords: probabilistic voting model; single mindedness theory; optimal taxation; positive approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D72 D78 H21 H23 H24 H27 H31 H53 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1896

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