College Admissions under Early Decision

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we model college admissions under early decision in a many-to-one matching framework with two periods. We show that there exists no stable matching system, involving an early decision matching rule and a regular decision matching rule, which is nonmanipulable via early decision quotas by colleges or via early decision preferences by colleges or students. We then analyze the Nash equilibria of the game, in which the preferences of colleges and students in each period are common knowledge and every college determines a quota for the early decision period given its total capacity for the two periods. Under college-optimal and student-optimal matching systems, we show that a pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. However, when colleges or students have common preferences over the other set of agents, 'terminating early decision program' becomes a weakly dominant strategy for each college if every student, choosing to act early, always applies early to his or her top choice college.

Keywords: Many-to-one matching; college admissions; early decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-sog
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Related works:
Working Paper: College Admissions under Early Decision (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1906

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