Allocation rules for museum pass programs

Sylvain Béal and Philippe Solal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider natural axioms for allocating the income of museum pass programs. Two allocation rules are characterized and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated TU-game introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003).

Keywords: Museum pass program; fair treatment; Shapley value; equal division solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-gth
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