Game theory on strategic communication: an approach from Thomas S. Schelling

Fernando Estrada and María Leonor Hernández Porrras

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In their recent work Thomas S. Schelling (2007, 2010), reiterating original arguments about game theory and its applications to social sciences. In particular, game theory helps to explore situations in which agents make decisions interdependent (strategic communication). Schelling's originality is to extend economic theory to social sciences. When a player can anticipate the options and influence the decisions of others. The strategy, indirect communication plays a crucial role. To illustrate, we investigate how to perform the payoff matrix in cases of bribery and threat

Keywords: Social Science; Schelling; game theory; strategic communications; bribes; threats. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 B0 B00 C7 C70 C72 D7 D8 D80 D81 D82 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50146/1/MPRA_paper_21772.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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