Mobile call termination in the UK

Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We discuss policy towards mobile call termination, illustrated by the 2002 Competition Commission enquiry into the UK mobile market. We present a model of the mobile market which includes both fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile call termination. In broad terms, the former service is likely to involve monopoly pricing if left unchecked, while the latter service---if the termination charge is jointly chosen by networks---may provide the mobile sector with the means by which to relax competition. Competition is often relaxed by choosing a low mobile-to-mobile termination charge. If feasible, then, unregulated networks often wish to set different termination charges depending on whether traffic originates on the fixed or mobile network. By contrast, social optimality often requires that uniform termination charges be imposed.

Keywords: Telecommunications; Regulation; Oligopoly; Call termination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L41 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2344/1/MPRA_paper_2344.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4858/1/MPRA_paper_4858.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9866/1/MPRA_paper_9866.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:2344

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().