Back to the roots: On the origins of the Fed's independence

Etienne Farvaque

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This note considers the foundations of the Federal Reserve Board's independence. Its origins are shown to reside in the American political philosophy, under which independence is an essential working condition for a perennial democracy.

Keywords: Federal Reserve Board; independence; constitution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 N20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24199/1/MPRA_paper_24199.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:24199

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().