Structural modeling of altruistic giving

Yves Breitmoser ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper analyzes econometric models of altruistic giving in dictator and public goods games. Using existing data sets, I evaluate internal and external validity of "atheoretic" regression models as well as structural models of random behavior, random coefficients, and random utility, controlling for subject heterogeneity by finite mixture modeling. In dictator games, atheoretic regression lacks external validity, while random coefficient models and random utility models offer high degrees of both internal and external validity. In public goods games, regression works comparably well, being bettered only by random utility models. Overall, the ordered GEV model of random utility is most appropriate to describe choices in the considered games.

Keywords: structural modeling; altruism; dictator game; public goods; ordered choice sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C50 C72 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dcm, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37537/2/MPRA_paper_37537.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:24262

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