A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts
Francesco Lancia and
Alessia Russo
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper investigates the conditions for the emergence of implicit intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, commitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-economic model in OLG environment where politicians play Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multidimensional political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension benefits and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital setting with labor income taxation. On the one hand, social security sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in education creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital driving the economy toward different Welfare State Regimes. Embedding a repeated-voting setup of electoral competition, we find that in a dynamic efficient economy both forward and backward intergenerational transfers simultaneously arise. The equilibrium allocation is education efficient, but, due to political overrepresentation of elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation compared with a Benevolent Government solution with balanced welfare weights.
Keywords: aging; Benevolent Government allocation; intergenerational redistribution; Markovian equilibria; repeated voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D71 E62 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dge, nep-mac, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts (2011) 
Working Paper: A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:24795
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