Optimal State-Contingent Unemployment Insurance

Juan Sanchez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Since the probability of finding a job is affected not only by individual effort but also by the aggregate state of the economy, designing unemployment insurance payments conditional on the business cycle could be valuable. This paper answers a fundamental question related to this issue: How should the payments vary with the aggregate state of the economy?

Keywords: Unemployment Insurance; Aggregate Fluctuations; Recursive Contracts and Moral Hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D74 D82 J65 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2535/1/MPRA_paper_2535.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal state-contingent unemployment insurance (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:2535

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().