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A Single-Mindedness model with n generations

Emanuele Canegrati

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump- sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic labour income taxation. Since the Government has to clear the budget, some generations obtain a benefit, whilst some other must pay the entire cost of social secutiry systems. I will demonstrate that generations which are more single-minded on leisure are the most better off since they are more able to capture politicians in the political competition. Further- more, it could be the case that candidates are not forced to undertake the same policies in equilibrium and I will demonstrate that this result holds only once an endogenous density function for individual preferences for politicians is considered.

Keywords: income distribution; probabilistic voting models; Single-mindedness; overlapping generations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D11 D30 D31 D63 D71 D72 D74 H11 H23 H24 H31 H50 H53 H55 H60 H61 I38 J13 J2 J22 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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