Preparing for Basel IV: why liquidity risks still present a challenge to regulators in prudential supervision

Marianne Ojo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers and assesses various explanations attributed as principal factors of the recent Financial Crisis. In particular, it focuses on two principal regulatory tools which constitute the basis of the framework promulgated by recent Basel Committee's initiatives, that is, Basel III. These two regulatory tools being capital and liquidity requirements. Various conclusions have been put forward to explain what triggered the recent Financial Crisis. This paper aims to explain why the Basel Committee's liquidity requirements and present proposals aimed at addressing liquidity risks, still represent a very modest milestone in efforts aimed at addressing challenges in prudential regulation and supervision. Even though problems attributed to capital adequacy requirements are considered by many authorities to have triggered the recent Crisis, the paper will highlight how runs on banks are triggered by liquidity crises and that liquidity risks cannot be isolated from systemic risks. In so doing, it will incorporate the roles assumed by information asymmetries and market based regulation – hence elaborate on how market based regulation could serve to address problems which trigger liquidity risks. Imperfect knowledge being a factor which is contributory to liquidity crises and bank runs, and market based regulation being essential in facilitating disclosure - since the Basel Committee's focus on banks and prudential supervision cannot on its own, address the challenges encountered in the present regulatory environment. Furthermore, it will address measures and proposals which could serve as bases for future regulatory reforms - as well as criticisms and challenges still encountered by recent Basel Committee initiatives.

Keywords: capital; liquidity; Basel III; Basel Committee; lender of last resort; banks; insurance; securities; information asymmetry; market based regulation; bail outs; disclosure; moral hazard; Dodd Frank Act; Financial Crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 E02 E52 G01 K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cta, nep-ias, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-rmg
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27627/1/MPRA_paper_27627.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70888/1/MPRA_paper_70888.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Preparing for Basel IV: why liquidity risks still present a challenge to regulators in prudential supervision (II) (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:27627

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