Too Big to Fail: the Panic of 1927

Kazuki Yokoyama

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper measures that the Bank of Japan adopted the too-big-to-fail doctrine against the panic of 1927. The results at this paper imply that supported banks had higher closure risk or occupied key positions in the local loan-markets. And this paper finds that the Bank of Japan bailed out solvent banks if they had political importance.

Keywords: lender of last resort (LLR); too big to fail; the panic of 1927; bank closure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 N25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-his and nep-hpe
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2768/1/MPRA_paper_2768.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2829/1/MPRA_paper_2829.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3423/1/MPRA_paper_3423.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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