Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The result that firms competing in a Cournot oligopoly with pairwise collaboration form a complete network under zero or negligible link formation costs provided by Goyal and Joshi (2003) no longer hold in multi-market oligopolies. Link formation in one market affects a firm’s profitability in another market in a possibly negative way resulting in the fact that it is no longer always profitable in an unambiguous manner. With non-negative link formation costs, the stable networks have a dominant group architecture and efficient networks are charecterized by at most one non-singleton component with a geodesic distance between players that is less than three.

Keywords: networks; collaboration; R & D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28188/1/MPRA_paper_28188.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49781/8/MPRA_paper_49781.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies (2011)
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