Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem
Jose Alcalde and
Antonio Romero-Medina
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper proposes the notion of E-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose the use of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places Mechanism. It endows students a position according with the Gale and Shapley students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is E-stable, i.e. efficient, fair and immune to any justifiable objection that students can formulate.
Keywords: School allocation problem; Pareto efficient matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28206/1/MPRA_paper_28206.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Fair student placement (2017)
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement (2015)
Working Paper: Fair School Placement (2011)
Working Paper: On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28206
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