On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems

Jose Alcalde and Antonio Romero-Medina
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency and stability. Taking as a starting point the recent reform proposed by the Boston School Committee, we propose a marginal modification to reach our objective redefine how students are prioritize. Our proposal is to allow schools to prioritize only a small set of students an then use a common priority order for the rest. Under this condition we propose a score based priority ranking that makes the output of the new Boston Mechanism Pareto efficient and stable.

Keywords: School allocation problem; Pareto efficient matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28831/1/MPRA_paper_28831.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28891/1/MPRA_paper_28891.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fair student placement (2017)
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement (2015)
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement (2015)
Working Paper: Fair School Placement (2011)
Working Paper: Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem (2011)
Working Paper: Fair School Placement (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28831

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