A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma

Haoyang Wu (18621753457@163.com)

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will propose an algorithmic model and a non-binding scheme to help non-cooperative agents obtain Pareto-efficient payoffs self-enforcingly. The scheme stems from quantum game theory, but is applicable to the macro world immediately.

Keywords: Quantum game theory; Prisoner's Dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30070/1/MPRA_paper_30070.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34953/1/MPRA_paper_34953.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:30070

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter (winter@lmu.de).