In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections

Thomas Colignatus ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Democratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually quite undemocratic since winners are selected who don’t reflect the national sentiment. The paper gives the example of the 2007 French presidential elections. Under the currently and historically grown system of run-off plurality Sarkozy got elected while the more democratic method of Borda Fixed Point would have generated Bayrou. The example uses reasonable assumptions on underlying micro preferences.

Keywords: voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; run-off plurality; Borda Fixed Point; democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A2 D71 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3726/1/MPRA_paper_3726.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3170

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