Compulsory voting and tax revenues

Mihai Mutascu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using a panel-model approach, this paper investigates the validity of the relationship between level of tax revenues and type of voting. The data-set covers the period 2000-2010, and includes 135 countries. The main finding points out that the assumed function is linear and the compulsory vote tends to increase the tax revenues collected by public authority. The analysis in this paper covers the “gap” in the literature in this field.

Keywords: Tax revenues; Compulsory voting; Voluntary voting; Effects; Tax policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D70 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:33987

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