Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections

Aurélie Cassette, Etienne Farvaque and Jérôme Héricourt

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using a new database of French municipalities that covers 821 towns and 2 elections (2001 and 2008), we examine how the budget structure, degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent. We assess the specicities created by the two-round process under French electoral rule (a dual ballot under plurality rule). We show that in the first round of the electoral process, spending on equipment can influence the voter, and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent's score. In the second round, the incumbent's vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect. We show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense. The results suggest that the determinants of each round in a two-round electoral process are different.

Keywords: Economic voting; Local elections; Plurality rule; Visible expenditures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 H76 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34675/1/MPRA_paper_34675.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:34675

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().